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ing with) reform. Law professors who do that work must be sensitive to, perhaps even greatly assist with, the work of other
academics, but should not forget the real limitations of their training and understanding. As Mark Tushnet once wrote, we are subject to the "lawyer as astrophysicist" myth, that any lawyer can
read a physics book over the weekend and send a rocket to the
moon on Monday.
State constitutional law was roundly ignored until, beginning
in the late 1970s, liberal law professors retreated in despair to state
supreme courts, hoping to find them more receptive to activism
than the Burger Court had become. Today state constitutional law
has become the haven for arguments rejected in the federal courts.
Why not invert the analysis-why not see whether federal constitutional law might profitably borrow from arguments accepted by
state courts in interpreting state constitutions? For example, the
Supreme Court has fallen into a morass attempting to decide issues
associated with the separation of powers (for example, the nondelegation doctrine and the legislative veto). In doing so, the Court
gave no hint of being aware that some state supreme courts have
had interesting things to say on such subjects under their own constitutions. It might seem demeaning for constitutional scholars to
dirty their hands with state cases, but ultimately it might be more
valuable than many of the other things we routinely do.
CARL A. AUERBACH34
My dissatisfaction with the constitutional scholarship of law
professors is long-standing. That scholarship is devoted primarily
to the analysis of Supreme Court opinions, yet generally neglects
the critical examination of their legislative fact assumptions and social consequences. In this Bicentennial year, I know of no work by
a law professor evaluating the structural foundation which the Constitution erected for a democratic republic.
When the Constitution was adopted, we were an underdeveloped nation with a small homogeneous population living mostly on
farms. Little, if anything, has been written on whether the Constitution's structure of federalism and the separation of powers continues to suit a large, pluralistic nation that spans a continent and
possesses the most developed economy functioning in an interdependent world-a nation that has assumed global responsibilities.
Yet there has been a spate of writing on whether Garcia v. San
34.
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Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority should have overruled National League of Cities v. Usery.
Despite general talk of a "new federalism," we have heard little
from law professors about how, and within what legal framework,
powers, resources and activities should be divided among federal,
state, and local authorities so as best to serve the diverse needs of
our people.
I also think that constitutional scholarship commands a disproportionate share of scarce, intellectual resources in the law
schools. After all, the Supreme Court is not the most important
maker of public policy. The legislatures that created the welfare
state and protected civil rights have done more to promote equality
than even the Supreme Court. Too little attention, relatively speaking, is being paid to their work or the political processes that account for it. For example, there is much more writing urging the
Supreme Court to read an economic bill of rights (not President
Reagan's version) into the Constitution than about the legislation
and administrative structure that would be needed practically to
guarantee to all people jobs, health care, education, and the other
necessities that the advocates of an economic bill of rights have in
mind. It is a shame, too, that the debate about the social functions
of private law has been left almost entirely to the adherents of Law
and Economics and Critical Legal Studies.
KIRK EMMERT35
It is difficult, if not impossible, to foresee the issues, political
configuration, and constitutional direction which will dominate the
Supreme Court in the next decade or more. But there is little doubt
that one of the most important questions underlying the activities of
the Court, and scholarship about it, will be its role in our constitutional liberal democracy. In recent years this question has been explored in greater depth than at any other time in our history, with
the exception perhaps of the New Deal, the Civil War, or the
Founding. Among the more immediate causes of this are the nomination or appointment of controversial Justices, interest in our institutions kindled by the Bicentennial, increased scholarly concern
during the last two decades, particularly among political scientists
and historians, with American political thought and institutions,
and widespread public and scholarly questioning of the dominant,
liberal consensus regarding the rule of the Court and the nature of
constitutional jurisprudence. But whatever the immediate causes
35.
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